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THE MORE THINGS STAY THE SAME, THE MORE
THEY CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE HARRY
PREGERSON ON FRANCHISE MOVEMENT POLICY IN
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron*
For a guy who thought sports were fun, and liked to say, “Fun is
bullshit,” Judge Harry Pregerson has had a significant impact on the
application of antitrust law to major league team sports. Harry’s landmark ruling forty years ago in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, which rejected the NFL’s singleentity defense (“Single Entity Ruling”), helped improve the lives of others. The Single-Entity Ruling opened the door to significant franchise
movement in professional teams sports, which in turn caused the big
shots running major league sports to be more responsive to market
forces in at least three ways. First, the Single-Entity Ruling ushered in
a new era of franchise movement, especially in the NFL. Second, it exposed to antitrust scrutiny a variety of anticompetitive practices other
than franchise relocation policy. Third, the Single-Entity Ruling helped
spawn new forms of sports ownership that were designed, among other
things, to evade antitrust scrutiny by looking more like genuine parts of
a single business entity. Harry’s ultimate vindication came almost thirty
years later, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, in
which the Supreme Court, without citing the Single-Entity Ruling by
name, nevertheless embraced Harry’s reasoning and result, and did so
unanimously.

* Marshall F. McComb Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles. My
thanks to Jeff Birren and Kevin Johnson for reviewing prior drafts of this Article, and to Samantha Schurmer for her excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are mine alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The late Harry Pregerson didn’t even like football. In fact, he
wasn’t much of a fan of any sport, professional or amateur.
Four decades ago, when I served as Harry’s law clerk, the Raiders
were in the middle of a championship run. It was their second season as
the new tenants of the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.1 Their roster
included future Hall of Famers Marcus Allen at running back, Ray Guy
at punter, Mike Haynes at cornerback, and Howie Long at defensive
end.2 Lyle Alzado, the other defensive end, was built and played like
The Incredible Hulk; Todd Christensen, their tight end, went on to catch
twelve touchdown passes that season; and Jim Plunkett, the durable
quarterback who made those touchdown passes, threw what proved to
be the game-winning touchdown to wide receiver Cliff Branch in Super
Bowl XVIII (although Allen’s magnificent seventy-four-yard-touchdown run to seal the victory is the play everyone remembers).3
At the same time, the team was morphing into a worldwide brand:
their “colors, swagger, and anti-establishment ethos” became linked with
the hip-hop scene that started in South Central L.A. and spread throughout the region.4 Rapper-turned-filmmaker Ice Cube, who wore a Raiders
1. Los Angeles Raiders Team History, SPORTS TEAM HIST., https://sportsteamhistory.com/los-angeles-raiders (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
2. See Raiders In the Pro Football Hall of Fame, LAS VEGAS RAIDERS,
https://www.raiders.com/history/hall-of-fame (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
3. See 1983 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE,
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1983.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2020); Associated Press, Allen’s 74-yard run in 1984 among Super Bowl’s best, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/raiders/allens-74-yard-run-1984-among-superbowls-best.
4. About
Straight
Outta
L.A.,
ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/30for30/film/_/page/straight-outta-la (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
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cap everywhere he went, helped make the silver and black culturally significant and made the team the toast of Southern California, especially
among Black and Latino fans.5 In the years that followed, a raft of Hollywood-caliber celebrities pledged their allegiance to the team. They
included rapper M.C. Hammer, golf legend Tiger Woods, basketball
icon Magic Johnson, and actor Tom Hanks.6 The region’s loyalty ran
deep; Southern California remained part of the Raiders Nation even after
the club had returned to the East Bay. On the last day of the regular
season in 2017, the Oakland Raiders visited the Los Angeles Chargers
at the Stub Hub Center in Carson, California.7 It was the first game that
they had played in the Los Angeles area since they left in 1994.8 But
Raiders fans outnumbered Chargers fans in attendance by at least three
to one.9 The game exposed a truth that the NFL had long refused to
admit: even after breaking up with the city twenty-four years earlier, the
Raiders were still L.A.’s favorite professional football team.10
None of this impressed Harry.
One day in chambers, I happened to mention that I had a ticket to
watch the Raiders play the Broncos at the Coliseum. I figured that the
author of one of the most important antitrust cases affecting professional
team sports would be interested in the fruits of his labor. Instead, he
asked me why I was going.
I said, “Because it’ll be fun, Judge.”
He replied, “Fun is bullshit.”
Now, I should explain that this was Harry’s instant reaction to every
type of diversion. He liked to say, “Fun is bullshit,” “Happiness is bullshit,” and, “Vacations are bullshit.” (I don’t recall his saying, “Sports
are bullshit,” but it wouldn’t surprise me if he did.)
That’s because Harry liked to work, and he always was working.
He spent Saturdays puttering in his backyard and Sundays visiting the
homeless shelters that he helped build. He spent his weeknights working
the telephones to get the support he needed to keep them going. He spent
his weekdays reviewing his caseload and editing drafts of opinions prepared by law clerks. He didn’t have time to watch sports on TV or,
5. See id.
6. See Richard Calhoun, 17 Famous Oakland Raiders Fans, FOX SPORTS (Oct. 26,
2016, 4:50 PM), https://www.foxsports.com/nfl/gallery/17-famous-oakland-raiders-fans012815.
7. See Dieter Kurtenbach, Kurtenbach: The Raiders’ L.A. ‘home’ game exposed the
NFL’s relocation mistakes, MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/12/31/oakland-raiders-los-angeles-chargers-nfl-2017-relocation-las-vegassan-diego-stubhub-center-stadium-soccer-gruden/.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
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heaven forbid, attend the games. His wife Bern complained that Harry
wouldn’t even take her to watch California Bears football when he was
attending law school at Berkeley and she was an undergraduate there.
The only sporting events he went to in all the years I knew him were
high school basketball games starring his grandson Bradley.
What Harry meant by calling fun “bullshit” was that true enjoyment
in life comes not from pursuing one’s selfish desires, but from helping
other people. And he enjoyed life immensely. No federal judge in
American history did more to help make other people’s lives better than
Harry Pregerson did. Both on and off the bench, where he served as a
federal judge for fifty years, Harry Pregerson devoted all his energy to
making other people’s lives better,11 even when his family might have
preferred his spending more time relaxing with them.
Which brings me to the Raiders Antitrust Litigation. Harry’s landmark ruling in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League,12 which rejected the NFL’s single-entity defense (“Single-Entity Ruling”), helped improve the lives of others—even if Judge
Pregerson himself had doubts.13 The Single-Entity Ruling opened the
door to significant franchise movement in professional teams sports,
which in turn caused the big shots running major league sports to be
more responsive to market forces. They were forced to honor the demands of fans in cities like Los Angeles who wanted their own teams,
even when the owners of rival clubs resisted.
To these ends, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the Raiders Antitrust Litigation, including the plans of club owner
Al Davis to move the franchise from Oakland to Los Angeles. Part II
summarizes the Single-Entity Ruling and Harry’s rationale for it. Part
III explains the impact of the Single-Entity Ruling on franchise relocation in both the NFL and other professional team sports.

11. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Harry Pregerson, the Real Mayor of Los Angeles, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 311 (2007); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Real Mayor of
Los Angeles, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 1, 2017, at 8 [hereinafter Cameron, The Real Mayor of Los
Angeles].
12. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
13. Harry once told me that the most important opinions he wrote concerned better
schools for children; equal rights for women and minorities; dignity for veterans and immigrants; respect for gay people; food for the hungry and shelter for the homeless; and clean
water, affordable housing, and better transportation for everyone. See Cameron, The Real
Mayor of Los Angeles, supra note 11. His Single-Entity Ruling in the Raiders Antitrust Litigation didn’t make the list. In fact, he rarely spoke about the case, and when he did, it was to
talk about the lawyers’ performances, not the merits of the case, much less the exploits of the
Raiders.
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II. THE RAIDERS ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A. The Raiders Decide to Leave Oakland for Los Angeles
In the forty years before the 1980 regular season, when the Raiders
announced their plan to move from Oakland to Los Angeles, the NFL14
saw only five franchise relocations from one metropolitan area to another. These relocations included the Rams, who moved from Cleveland
to Los Angeles in 1946; the Colts, who moved from Dallas to Baltimore
in 1953 (and changed their name from the Texans); the Cardinals, who
moved from Chicago to St. Louis in 1960; the Chargers, who moved
from Los Angeles to San Diego in 1961; and the Chiefs, who moved
from Dallas to Kansas City in 1963 (and also changed their name from
the Texans).15
Of the many reasons accounting for this relative lack of movement,
the most significant was Article IV, Section 3 of the NFL’s Constitution
and Bylaws (“Rule 4.3”), a rule that had been adopted by the club owners
themselves.16 It banned any club from moving “its franchise or playing
site to a different city” without the prior approval of three-fourths of the
all the clubs in the league.17 Under Rule 4.3, Al Davis, the mercurial and

14. The term “NFL” as used in this Article refers to the combined franchises of both the
old NFL and the old American Football League (AFL), a separate professional football league
that merged into what is known collectively as the NFL. When the Chiefs moved to Kansas
City and the Chargers moved to San Diego, they were both AFL franchises. Under the merger
agreement, which was announced in 1966 and took effect in 1970, the two leagues became
one league with two conferences. The history and records of the AFL were incorporated into
the NFL, but the AFL’s name and logo were retired. See History.com Editors, NFL and AFL
announce merger, HISTORY (June 5, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nfland-afl-announce-merger.
15. See Jeff Kerr, Las Vegas Raiders latest NFL franchise to change cities: Here’s a look
at all 11 who’ve done it, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/las-vegas-raiders-latest-nfl-franchise-to-change-citiesheres-a-look-at-all-11-whove-doneit/#:~:text=Other%20NFL%20franchises%20to%20relocate,Chicago%20Cardinals%20mov
e%20to%20St. Notes: The Patriots moved from Boston to Foxboro, Massachusetts, in 1971
(and changed their name from the Boston Patriots to the New England Patriots) but remained
in the Boston metropolitan area. See Team History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME,
https://www.profootballhof.com/teams/new-england-patriots/team-history/ (last visited Oct.
3, 2020). The Rams moved from Los Angeles to Anaheim, California, in 1980, but remained
in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. See Rams Sign Contracts With Anaheim, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/22/archives/rams-sign-contracts-withanaheim-a-35year-lease-signed.html.
16. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 4.3 (rev. ed. 2006).
17. Id. Originally, Rule 4.3 required the unanimous approval of the owners. In late 1978,
with the relocation of the Rams from Los Angeles to Oakland on the horizon, the rule was
amended to require the three-fourths approval of the owners. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum
Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984).
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outspoken owner of the Raiders,18 had to persuade at least twenty-one of
his twenty-seven colleagues to vote in favor of moving the Raiders from
Oakland to L.A.19 Davis, who was unhappy with the lack of progress in
negotiations for a new or expanded venue at the Oakland Coliseum,
never got the chance. Against Davis’ wishes, the NFL clubs met and
voted against him, twenty-two to zero, with five abstentions.20 Undeterred, Davis made plans to move anyway. His plans happened to coincide with a vacancy in what was then L.A.’s premier sports venue: the
aging but still-venerable Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.21
The Coliseum, which had opened in 1923 and later hosted the 1932
and 1984 Olympic Games, was located five miles south of City Hall.22
For decades, it had served as the home field for three major football
teams: the Los Angeles Rams, the UCLA Bruins, and the USC Trojans.
In fact, the USC campus was right across the street.23 But in 1978, the
NFL owners approved the Rams’ move to Angel Stadium in Anaheim,
California, which was located thirty-five miles south in Orange
County.24 The change would be effective for the 1980-81 season.25 It
would be the first time that the Coliseum had lacked a professional football tenant since 1946.26 (A few years later, the Bruins would move
nineteen miles north to the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California, leaving
the Trojans as the only football tenant.27) The Coliseum Commission,
which operated the venue, responded by requesting that the NFL provide
a new tenant.28 When a firm commitment to do so was not forthcoming,
the Commission filed suit against the NFL and its member clubs on the
theory that Rule 4.3 and related franchise movement rules violated the
Sherman Act.29 The Raiders had not yet expressed a desire to move to
18. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1385; Jon Wertheim, How the Influence
of Al Davis Shaped the Modern NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/08/27/al-davis-oakland-raiders-nfl-100-seasons.
19. L.A. Mem’l. Coliseum Com’n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986).
20. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1385.
21. Id.
22. Coliseum History, L.A. COLISEUM, https://www.lacoliseum.com/coliseum-history/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2020); Driving Directions from LA Memorial Coliseum to Rosebowl
Stadium, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps.
23. Getting Here, L.A. COLISEUM, https://www.lacoliseum.com/directions/ (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020); Coliseum History, supra note 22.
24. Rams Sign Contracts With Anaheim, supra note 15.
25. Id.
26. Coliseum History, supra note 22.
27. UCLA History, UCLA ALUMNI (Aug. 18, 1982), https://alumni.ucla.edu/uclahistory/ucla-history4/#:~:text=The%20UC%20Board%20of%20Regents,Coach%20Terry%20Donahue%20’67
%2C%20M.A.
28. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 1385.
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L.A. or joined the Commission as plaintiffs, and were, therefore, named
a defendant as a member club.30 Thereafter, the NFL filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment to enjoin enforcement of the Rule 4.3.31
In early 1979, Harry Pregerson, presiding as the District Court
judge, granted the motion to dismiss the complaint, with leave to amend,
but denied the motion to enjoin enforcement of Rule 4.3.32 The main
reason was that the Commission had not proved its standing to sue.33 In
particular, the complaint did not allege the reasonable likelihood that the
NFL would injure the business of operating the Coliseum by refusing to
approve the tenancy of either an expansion team or a relocated franchise;34 up to that point, nobody had asked and no votes had been taken.
And without a plaintiff having standing, plus a fully developed record,
Harry could not determine whether the application of Rule 4.3 unreasonably violated the antitrust laws.35
B. The Raiders Antitrust Litigation: A Story in Three Parts
After studying Harry’s dismissal ruling, lawyers for the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint addressing his concerns. But without an
NFL franchise seeking to play in the Coliseum, the case languished for
a year. Then, in early 1980, Davis helped revive the suit by announcing
his intention to move the Raiders’ home games to the Coliseum.36 Without being asked, the NFL clubs reacted by meeting and voting to reject
the move.37 The many reasons for this resistance would no doubt fill a
book, but one of the big ones seemed to lie in the personal animosity
between Commissioner Pete Rozelle, the league’s long-serving chief executive, and Davis, its most outspoken owner-critic.38 Rozelle once described Davis as an “outlaw” among NFL owners.39 In return, Davis
claimed that the “real reason” why the NFL refused to grant permission
to move was because Rozelle “wanted Los Angeles for himself. He
30. Id.; L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
31. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 468 F. Supp. at 154.
32. Id. at 156, 167-68.
33. Id. at 157-62.
34. Id. at 159.
35. Id. at 167-68.
36. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984).
37. Id.
38. See Ken Belson, Awkward Handoff of Lombardi Trophy Has Roots in Renegade
Raiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/sports/football/super-bowl-pete-rozelle-al-davis-roger-goodell-robert-kraft.html.
39. NFL, Davis Fail to Reach Settlement, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Feb. 6,
1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126282435.
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finally said it was the best city in the country to have a team and he
wasn’t about to let me have it.”40
Thereafter, Rozelle notified the Raiders that the league would continue to schedule all their homes games in Oakland.41 So the Raiders
switched sides and joined the Coliseum’s suit as co-plaintiffs,42 and Davis signed an agreement with the Commission to permit the Raiders to
play in their new venue as early as the 1980-81 season.43
When repeated settlement efforts by Harry proved unsuccessful,44
the Raiders Antitrust Litigation went to trial. The liability proceeding
was bifurcated from the damages phase, and the case proceeded in three
parts: there was a first liability trial (“First Liability Trial”), which ended
with a hung jury and the grant of a motion for a new trial; there was a
second liability trial (“Second Liability Trial”), which ended with a verdict and a judgment in favor of the Raiders and the Coliseum Commission; and there was a damages trial (“Damages Trial”), which resulted
in a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.45
1. First Liability Trial
The First liability Trial, which lasted from May to July 1981,46 generated plenty of drama, perhaps due to the parties’ perceptions that the
stakes were high.
The proceedings, which each day began with the type of solemnity
Harry preferred, were called to order by Dick Johnson, Harry’s longtime
courtroom deputy. Dick intoned: “In the presence of the flag of our

40. Rich Tosches, Raiders Win Antitrust Suit, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 8, 1982, at 2,
LEXIS Job No. 126282935.
41. Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule
of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 957 (1988).
42. See, e.g., id.
43. See, e.g., Raiders Agree to Play in L.A., FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Mar. 7,
1980, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126283041.
44. The obvious settlement options were either to grant Los Angeles an expansion team
and require the Raiders to remain in Oakland or to permit the Raiders to move to L.A. and
grant Oakland an expansion team. The league resisted both options. See, e.g., Dave Brady,
Court Plan: Move Raiders, Give Oakland New Franchise; Raider Proposal Unsupported,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1980, at E1, LEXIS Job No. 126283237; Byron Rosen, Judge Urges
Raiders, NFL to Solve Dispute, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1981, at D3, LEXIS Job No.
126283400; NFL, Davis Fail to Reach Settlement, supra note 39; see also, e.g., John F. Berry,
Rozelle Denies ‘78 Deal With Davis on Transfer, WASH. POST, May 23, 1981, at D1, LEXIS
Job No. 126283525.
45. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
46. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
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country and the Constitution for which it stands, this United States District Court is now in session.”47
Then the drama began. Early on, the NFL served subpoenas demanding that Melvin Durslag and Scot Paltrow, two reporters of the
now-defunct Los Angeles Herald Examiner, a newspaper published by
what was left of the Hearst empire, produce any notes, files, and recordings of conversations they might have had with confidential sources
about the proposed transfer of the Raiders or the Rams to another city.48
Citing the California journalists’ privilege, Harry issued an order quashing the subpoenas.49
When Harry informed prospective jurors that the trial could take
three to four months, more drama ensued. Of 130 potential jurors called
to the courthouse on the first day of jury selection, fifty were excused
after pleading hardships ranging from work schedules to vacations. One
man told Harry, “I have a prepaid vacation planned for September.50 If
the trial lasted that long, I’d have to look for a new wife to take on a later
vacation.” Harry replied, “I think we may all have the same problem.”51
Then the league, claiming that it would be prejudiced by what it
called massive pretrial publicity, filed a motion to transfer venue from
the Central District of California to another, unspecific district outside
the seven-county metropolitan area surrounding L.A.52 Harry knew the
district occupied a land mass the size of Delaware and Rhode Island
combined, and counted some 10 million residents, so he observed:
“[T]he court can easily imagine that many persons in the district have no
interest in either professional sports or football.”53 He knew this because
he was one of them. He issued an order denying the venue transfer request.54
As for everyone else, he reasoned that careful voir dire, which
would be accompanied by detailed questionnaires put to everyone in the
jury pool, could be used to screen out biased jurors.55 Later, Harry
47. Email from Jeff Birren, former General Counsel, Raiders, to Christopher David Ruiz
Cameron (May 4, 2020) (on file with author) (recollection of former Raiders General Counsel
Jeffrey Birren).
48. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489, 490-92 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
The Last Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Strike, CSUN U. LIBR. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://library.csun.edu/SCA/Peek-in-the-Stacks/Examiner.
49. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 89 F.R.D. at 496.
50. Rich Tosches, Raiders-NFL Trial Gets Underway, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 11,
1981, LEXIS Job No. 126282935.
51. Id.
52. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 89 F.R.D. at 497.
53. Id. at 510.
54. Id. at 512.
55. Id. at 509 n.7.
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confided to me that he wasn’t sure the NFL believed its own argument.
When he offered to move the trial to Oxnard, a Central District farm
town located over sixty miles from downtown L.A., Patrick Lynch, the
NFL’s lead attorney, refused. In any event, the venue transfer motion
pushed back the scheduled trial date by several months.
But Harry did grant the NFL’s motion to exclude testimony about
alleged conversations between then-Commissioner Pete Rozelle and
Rams owner Georgia Frontiere about a supposed scheme to scalp tickets
to Super Bowl XIV at the Coliseum in 1980.56 Lynch called it “one small
step” for the league, but one that would not make it less “impossible to
find an unbiased and indifferent jury.”57
During opening statements, Max Blecher, the Coliseum Commission’s colorful lawyer, made it clear that the big-time business of professional football would be on trial—that “nothing less than the American
free enterprise system” was at stake.58 “When we lost the Rams [to Anaheim], we didn’t cry,” he said. “We did the redblooded American thing.
We went out and got ourselves a team. But they [the NFL] won’t let us
have it.”59 And he scoffed at the idea that the NFL was a single entity:
“They call themselves partners,” Blecher said, “and that is simply
ridiculous.” As partners, why don’t they share their profits? Sure,
they share television revenues, but what about the rest of their profits? “Not only don’t the teams share their wealth, they refuse to even
tell each other how much money they make each season. And you
call that a partnership?”60

Patrick Lynch, the NFL’s attorney, countered that the league was a
single organization that would “dissolve into chaos” if its rules could be
flouted by a single team like the Raiders.61 Relying on cartoon drawings,
he compared the league’s product—NFL football—to artisan pottery,
and the twenty-eight member clubs to the potter, the seller, and the other
men required to bring the pottery to market.62 “These are the agreements
between the men to market the product,” he told jurors. “They are working together to sell the product and they are working as a single unit.

56. Sports News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 1, 1981, LEXIS Job No. 126342115.
57. Id.
58. John F. Berry, Big-Business Football in Dock as Raider-NFL Trial Opens; RaiderNFL Trial Starts in L.A., WASH. POST, May 19, 1981, at D1, LEXIS Job No. 126284280.
59. Id.
60. Rich Tosches, Opening Arguments Begin in Raiders Trial, UNITED PRESS INT’L,
May 20, 1981, at 1-2, LEXIS Job No. 126284450.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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That’s what the NFL is. All twenty-eight teams in agreement to produce
a certain product.”63
The first two live witnesses were Pete Rozelle, the league’s longtime commissioner, and Eugene Klein, the owner of the San Diego
Chargers.64 Their testimony didn’t seem to put the league’s best foot
forward. A reporter observed that Rozelle’s “legendary smoothness”
came across as “evasiveness” in questioning by Joe Alioto, the former
San Francisco mayor, and lawyer for the Raiders.65 And after four hours
of strenuous testimony, Klein, then sixty, was hospitalized for a heart
attack, but was later listed in satisfactory condition.66
And then there was a controversial attempt by Rams’ attorney Joseph Cotchett to impeach Al Davis using excerpts from a magazine article in which Davis expressed a childhood admiration for Adolf Hitler.67
Harry called the excerpt “inflammatory and irrelevant” and ordered the
jury to disregard it.68
Two weeks into the trial, Harry asked the parties to present “miniarguments” to the jury.69 Instead of waiting until the end of the trial, he
gave each side an hour and-a-half to summarize what they felt had been
proved so far.70 Harry had adopted this unusual practice before during
lengthy and complex trials, because it helped the jury stay focused.71
A month later, with the trial still in full swing, Davis hosted a party
for the L.A. press corps in the grand ballroom of the Beverly Hilton Hotel.72 Each guest was greeted at the door by Raiderettes cheerleaders in
costume and invited to have their photograph taken while positioned between the club’s two shiny Super Bowl trophies, which were protected
by uniformed guards.73 The parting gift was a silver and black ruffled
garter bearing a metal logo of the club.74 A sports writer who got one
reported, “My wife threw mine out with the eggshells the next morning.”75
63. Id.
64. Joseph St. Amant, Jury to Hear Mini-Arguments in Antitrust Case, UNITED PRESS
INT’L, May 30, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126284619.
65. Amant, supra note 64, at 1.
66. Id.
67. Joseph St. Amant, Hassle Over Hitler Reference, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jun. 18,
1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126284688.
68. Id.
69. Amant, supra note 64.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Phil Elderkin, Los Angeles Watching the Oakland Raiders—In Court, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 30, 1981, at 2, LEXIS Job No. 126284775.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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After fifty-five days of testimony and thirteen days of deliberations,
with the whole process spanning four months, the jury of seven men and
three women, most of whom had little interest in professional football,
were unable to reach the required unanimous verdict.76 They deadlocked: eight votes went to the plaintiffs and two votes went to the defendants.77 It turned out that one of the votes for the defendants, Thomas
Gelker, had failed to disclose that his cousin, Bruce Gelker, once owned
the Portland Storm of the long-defunct World Football League.78 Davis
went so far as to call Gelker a “plant”—an accusation hotly disputed by
the NFL—but there was little evidence of this, and Gelker was not disqualified.79 Reluctantly, Harry declared a mistrial, and scheduled a new
trial to start in the fall of 1981.80
2. Second Liability Trial
The Second Liability Trial, which lasted from April to May 1982,
went a lot faster because Harry made the parties focus on the reasonableness of Rule 4.3 and imposed time limits on the testimony of witnesses, but chapter two of the Raiders saga generated plenty of drama of
its own.
For example, the NFL filed a motion asking Harry to limit the number of courtroom reporters in attendance to five.81 “We don’t want the
jurors to have a phalanx of reporters breathing down their necks as they
did in the last trial,” Patrick Lynch, the league’s attorney complained.82
“The way the matter was handled during the first trial was fine,” Harry
replied.83 He denied the motion.84
During jury selection, an unidentified woman placed a series of telephone calls alleging that a prospective juror had discussed the case with
his family and was concealing a bias against the league.85 The calls were
76. James J. Doyle, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 30, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No.
126346118; Joan Goulding, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Aug. 15, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No.
126346479.
77. Joan Goulding, The first phase of the bitter feud between the…, UNITED PRESS INT’L
(Aug. 15, 1981), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/08/15/The-first-phase-of-the-bitterfeud-between-the/5834366696000/.
78. Joan Goulding, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Aug. 13, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No.
126346936.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Domestic News, Mistrial Declared in NFL-Oakland Antitrust Suit,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 14, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126347918.
81. Carolyn Skorneck, Judge Refuses to Limit Number of Reporters, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 8, 1982, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126348447.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Sports News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Mar. 23, 1982, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126349116.
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placed to the chambers of Judge Pregerson, the headquarters of the
Rams, and the law offices of O’Melveny & Myers, where Lynch was a
partner.86 “I have a feeling that we’re probably dealing with a crank
caller and will never get to the bottom of this,” Harry said, and Alioto
agreed.87 “There are two events that tend to bring out the nuthouse brigade,” he said. “One is a full moon and the other is a major trial.”88
Once the jury was picked, Lynch complained that five of the six
jurors were women.89 “It would have been better to have more of a balance of men,” he said.90 He also got into a shouting match with Alioto
over whether the NFL had investigated the backgrounds of the jurors in
the First Liability Trial.91 Despite the complaints, the trial moved forward.
In the end, after just twenty-one days of testimony and only five
and a half hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in the Second Liability Trial.92 The news made the front page of the
New York Times.93 “I’m elated,” a victorious Al Davis proclaimed.94
“I knew it would happen, but it’s no less exciting. We won it on credibility and the facts,” Davis affirmed. “For fifteen years we’ve known
that rule was illegal, and knocking it down like this won’t hurt the NFL
one bit. We’ll still be a great league, but now our laws will conform to
the laws of the United States.”95 Alioto called it a “smashing victory
over a very tough and worthy opponent.”96 Blecher added that the swiftness of the verdict was no surprise.97 “I think the toughest thing the jury
had to do was pick a foreman,” he said. “The NFL had no case. It wasn’t
even close.”98
A few weeks later, Harry issued an injunction barring the NFL from
interfering with the Raiders’ move from Oakland to Los Angeles,99 and
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Sports News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Mar. 25, 1982, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126349976.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Bart Barnes, Hill: No Change in Sentiment on Antitrust, WASH. POST, May 9, 1982,
at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126350325.
93. Associated Press, NFL Violated Law in Forbidding Team to Move, Jury Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 1982, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126350627 (Section 1, Page 1).
94. Rich Tosches, Raiders Win Antitrust Suit, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 8, 1982, at 1,
LEXIS Job No. 126350758.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Associated Press, Raiders Again Beat N.F.L. in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/15/sports/raiders-again-beat-nfl-in-thecourts.html.
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the die was cast. During what would become the strike-shortened 198283 season,100 the club went on to win all four of its home games at the
Coliseum.101 After cruising to an eight to one record, however, the Raiders lost to the Jets in the second round of the playoffs.102 But the next
year, during a full-schedule 1983-84 season, the team would win six of
their eight home games at the Coliseum.103 After compiling a twelve-tofour record, the team marched through the playoffs and won Super Bowl
XVIII.104
3. Damages Trial
From September 1982 through May 1983, while the appeals of the
Single-Entity Ruling and injunction were pending, the Damages Trial
proceeded.105 A huge verdict came back in favor of the plaintiffs: the
Coliseum Commission was awarded almost $14.6 million in antitrust
damages (trebled from over $4.8 million); the Raiders were awarded almost $34.7 million in antitrust damages (trebled from nearly $11.6 million); and the Raiders were awarded another almost $11.6 million in
damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
California state law.106 Later, in 1986, the same Ninth Circuit panel that
had affirmed the Single-Entity Ruling affirmed the Coliseum Commission’s award by a unanimous vote, vacated and remanded for recalculation the Raiders’ award by a two-to-one vote, and reversed the Raiders’
good-faith-and-fair-dealing verdict by a unanimous vote.107

100. Dan Flaherty, 1982 NFL Season, SPORTS NOTEBOOK (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.thesportsnotebook.com/tag/1982-nfl-season/.
101. 1982 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE,
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1982.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
102. Id.
103. 1983 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE,
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1983.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
104. Id.
105. L.A. Mem’l. Coliseum Com’n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1375-76.
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III. THE SINGLE-ENTITY RULING
The Single-Entity Ruling was issued by Harry in his capacity as a
district judge sitting by designation108—that is, as an overtime gig in addition to his regular job as a United States circuit judge, for which he
received not a penny more in salary. (In 1979, when Harry was elevated
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, he had kept and continued
to manage several big, docket-busting cases, one of which was the Raiders Antitrust Litigation.109) The Single-Entity Ruling addressed what
would prove to be the pivotal question of law in the Raiders Antitrust
Litigation: whether or not the NFL was a single economic entity incapable of conspiring with itself to violate the antitrust laws.110
Since 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act has outlawed
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.”111 Section 1 is meant to enforce the First Commandment of
antitrust law: the competitive market, not any artificial barrier erected by
buyers or sellers, should determine the price of goods and services.112
The Raiders and the Coliseum Commission had sued the NFL and its
twenty-seven member teams on the theory that Rule 4.3, the league’s
restrictive franchise relocation rule, was the means by which other franchise owners had engaged in an illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain the trade of offering NFL football to the Los Angeles
market.113 Under Rule 4.3, the plaintiffs needed to persuade twenty-one
clubs to approve the move from Oakland to L.A., but they failed to attract a single vote.114 No club owner showed any sign of budging. To
win their lawsuit, the Raiders would have to prove that Rule 4.3 should
be thrown out on the ground that it unreasonably restrained trade.115 But
first, they had to show that the NFL was really twenty-eight separate

108. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
109. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. at 582; Sam Roberts, Harry
Pregerson, Judge Guided by Conscience, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/obituaries/harry-pregerson-dead-ninth-circuit-judgeguided-by-conscience.html.
110. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. at 582.
111. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
112. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 6 (2d ed. 2006).
113. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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entities capable of conspiring with each other rather than a single entity
incapable of such a feat.116
In the spring of 1981, as the Second Liability Trial came to a close,
the parties filed cross-motions for a directed verdict on the question
whether the NFL must be considered a single entity for purposes of the
Raiders Antitrust Litigation.117 The NFL and the other clubs, including
the L.A. Rams, filed briefs asking Harry to adopt the single-entity defense and to take the case away from the jury; the Raiders and the Coliseum Commission filed briefs asking him to rule that the twenty-eight
clubs were separate economic entities and to instruct the jury accordingly.118 Although Harry found the question to be “a close one,” he came
to be convinced that “the undisputed facts preclude treating the NFL as
a single entity for purposes of this lawsuit.”119
Harry began with what the record showed “[o]n its face”: that the
NFL “certainly appears to be an association of separate business entities
rather than one single enterprise.”120
[The clubs] are separate legal entities: some corporations, some partnerships, and some sole proprietorships. No two clubs have a common owner. The clubs share a large part, but not all, of their revenues. They do not share their profits or losses. They are managed
independently, each making its own decisions concerning ticket
prices, player acquisitions and salaries, the hiring of coaches and administrators and the terms of their stadium leases. They do not exchange or share their accounting books and records.121

Citing longstanding precedents by the U.S. Supreme Court122 and
the Ninth Circuit,123 Harry observed that the single-entity defense had
been rejected “in circumstances more favorable to that argument than
those presented in this case.”124 Even a parent company and its subsidiary had been held by the Supreme Court to be separate entities capable

116. Id.
117. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
123. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976).
124. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
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of conspiring together to violate the antitrust laws, despite having common ownership.125
Next, Harry took on the league’s argument that the unitary or joint
venture nature of the product it creates—namely, NFL football—necessarily implied that the league was a single entity. He quoted from the
NFL’s brief: “[T]he economic substance is that of a single firm selling a
single product involving a necessary contribution from each member.”126
According to Harry, this argument suffered from at least three defects.
First, the NFL’s argument, if accepted, “would prove too much.”127
If the league would have to be treated as a single entity for purposes of
litigation attacking its franchise relocation restrictions, simply because
the member clubs must cooperate in order to produce exhibitions in the
form of football games, then it also would have to be treated as a single
entity for purposes of litigation attacking its player acquisition restrictions.128 As every student of sports law knows, however, player acquisition restrictions “have repeatedly been found to violate Section 1
[of the Sherman Antitrust Act].”129 In fact, as early as 1957, the Supreme
Court had declared the NFL and its member clubs to be subject to the
federal antitrust laws—and implicitly, capable of conspiring among
themselves to violate those laws—without regard for the unitary nature
of the enterprise.130
Second, organizations other than the NFL, whose product is just as
unitary in nature, have been found to violate Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.131 The “clearest instance” of this was the case involving
the Associated Press (AP).132 The AP, an incorporated association
whose members were and are newspapers, pooled their resources to
gather and distribute news that no individual paper could manage to do
single-handedly.133 The Supreme Court had no trouble finding the AP’s
by-laws, which prevented the competitors of member papers from
125. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
126. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 519 F. Supp. at 583 (quoting NFL’s Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 519 F. Supp. (No.
78-3523-HP)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal vacated, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978)).
130. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
131. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
132. Id.; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Harry offered a second,
similar instance. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (making similar finding
as to relationship between the famed stock exchange and its individual broker-members).
133. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 519 F. Supp. at 583.
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joining the association, restrained free trade.134 Harry reasoned: “This
was a product or service distinct from that of the member publishers, and
one requiring the cooperation of all the members, none of whom had the
facilities or resources to produce AP’s stream of worldwide news.”135
Third, the NFL’s argument rested on a “false premise”—namely,
that the individual clubs “are not separate business entities whose products have an independent value.”136 (He might have added that, even
within the same league, different franchises fetch different sale prices,
depending on the good will, history, market, and win-loss record associated with the franchise.)137 Just because it takes a “cooperative framework” to produce football games “does not show that each club can produce football games only as an NFL member.”138 Harry explained that
many NFL clubs, including the Raiders, used to operate as members of
a rival football league: the old AFL (American Football League). “There
is no conceptual reason why any NFL team could not decide to pull out
and join a new league.”139 Besides, sports fans “quite often wish to spend
their money on the games of a particular team, not simply on ‘NFL football.’ ” 140
Therefore, Harry concluded, the NFL’s member teams “should be
treated as separate business enterprises for purposes of this lawsuit.”141
He agreed with the league that its business structure “presupposes a degree of mutual cooperation perhaps unique to the world of professional
sports,” but felt that “such unique features” were more relevant to
“weighing the reasonableness of the restraint at issue in this case—a task
for the jury—and do not suffice to exempt that restraint from antitrust
scrutiny altogether by establishing a single entity defense.”142 Accordingly, Harry granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict rejecting
the single entity defense and denied the defendants’ motion for a directed
verdict accepting that defense.143

134. Id.; Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 22-23.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 584.
137. See generally JON MORGAN, GLORY FOR SALE: FANS, DOLLARS, AND THE NEW NFL
(1997); see also CHARLES C. EUCHNER, PLAYING THE FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE
AND CITIES FIGHT TO KEEP THEM 33 (1994) (discussing franchise movement in Major
League Baseball).
138. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 585 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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On May 6, 1982, the jury was given instructions consistent with the
Single-Entity Ruling and sent out to deliberate as to whether Rule 4.3
was an unreasonable restraint of trade.144
On May 7, just a day later, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Coliseum Commission and the Raiders.145 It found the NFL and the
other clubs liable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.146
On June 14, Harry entered judgment on the liability issues along
with a permanent injunction barring the NFL and its other member clubs
from interfering with the transfer of the Raiders franchise from Oakland
to Los Angeles.147
Finally, on July 24, 1981, Harry published his opinion directing a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and laying out his rationale as summarized above.148
The NFL appealed.149 By a vote of two to one, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment, including the Single-Entity Ruling and the permanent injunction barring the league from
interfering with the club’s move to L.A.150 Writing for the majority,
Judge J. Blaine Anderson, joined by Judge Dorothy Nelson, endorsed
Harry’s rationale and declared that it was consistent with decisions by
the Second,151 Eighth,152 Ninth,153 and D.C. Circuits,154 rejecting the single-entity defense in the context of various NFL rules otherwise found
to violate the antitrust laws, and with decisions by the Supreme Court155
in analogous contexts.156 Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit went on
to affirm the jury’s finding that Rule 4.3 constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.157

144. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
145. Id. at 1386.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
149. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 1382, 1384, 1401.
151. Id. at 1388; see N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
152. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977), overruled by Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 731 F.3d 752 (8th Cir.
2013).
153. See Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal vacated, 586 F2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978).
154. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
155. Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding common ownership of enterprise insufficient to preclude application of section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (same).
156. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984).
157. Id. at 1382.
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Dissenting, Judge Spencer Williams, a district judge from Northern
California who was sitting by designation,158 would have adopted the
NFL’s single entity defense.159 To Judge Williams, the “crucial criterion” was whether the league’s “formally distinct member clubs compete
in any economically meaningful sense in the marketplace.”160 He
thought not. Judge Williams criticized Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling for
“ignoring the subtle, but yet more significant interdependency . . . and
. . . indivisibility” of the twenty-eight clubs.161 Putting aside the “formalistic aspects” of the clubs’ separate organizational and relational status,162 he concluded that the “profound interdependency” of the league
and its member clubs “in the daily operation and strategic marketing of
professional football” should have carried the day.163
Shortly thereafter, all appeals of the judgment in the Second Liability Trial were exhausted when the Supreme Court denied review.164
Of course, the Single-Entity Ruling attracted both defenders and
skeptics.165 Besides Judge Williams, who dissented from the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Harry’s ruling, some scholars have criticized the rejection of the single-entity defense by courts in general166 and Harry’s
ruling in particular.167

158. Id. at 1384.
159. Id. at 1401.
160. Id. at 1404 (Williams, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
162. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984).
163. Id. at 1405 (Williams, J., dissenting).
164. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 469 U.S. 990 (1984), cert. denied, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
165. Cf., e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the SingleEntity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L. J. 25, 34-35 (1991) (providing no
comment directly on Single-Entity Ruling, but observing that a professional sports league’s
“seemingly odd mixture of competition and cooperation” is no different than “cooperating to
produce an automobile”).
166. See, e.g., Milton Handler & Thomas A. Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 23-26 (1981) (cited by L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984)).
167. See, e.g., Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports, Antitrust,
the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 962-75
(1988) (attacking Single-Entity Ruling and Harry’s jury instructions); see also, e.g., Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV.
889, 894 (1999) (arguing for federal legislation immunizing leagues from antitrust liability
out of fear that, without economic cooperation, professional sports leagues would find it “impossible . . . to operate at all”); Katherine C. Leone, Note, No Team, No Peace: Franchise
Free Agency in the National Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 477 (1997) (same).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY RULING
In at least three respects, Harry’s rejection of the single-entity defense has had a tremendous impact on professional team sports in North
America.
First, the Single-Entity Ruling has ushered in a new era of franchise
movement, especially in the NFL. As noted above, in the forty years
before the 1980 regular season, the NFL saw only four franchise relocations from one metropolitan area to another.168 But in the forty years
after the 1980 regular season, the league saw eleven franchise relocations.169 These relocations involved the Raiders, who moved from Oakland to Los Angeles in 1982; the Colts, who moved from Baltimore to
Indianapolis in 1984; the Cardinals, who moved from St. Louis to Phoenix in 1987; the Rams, who moved from Anaheim to St. Louis in 1995;
the Raiders, who moved from Los Angeles back to Oakland in 1995; the
Ravens, who moved from Cleveland to Baltimore and changed their
name from the Browns in 1996; the Titans, who actually moved twice:
from Houston to Memphis in 1997 and then to Nashville in 1998 and
changed their name from the Oilers; the Rams, who moved from St.
Louis back to Los Angeles in 2016; the Chargers, who moved from San
Diego back to Los Angeles in 2017; and the Raiders, who moved from
Oakland to Las Vegas in 2020.170
These franchise movements were in response to the demand for
NFL football in the newer metropolitan markets to which the teams relocated—and sometimes, demand for the same product in the older metropolitan markets from which those teams had decamped.171 As a result,

168. Jeff Kerr, Las Vegas Raiders latest NFL franchise to change cities: Here’s a look at
all eleven who’ve done it, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/las-vegas-raiders-latest-nfl-franchise-to-change-citiesheres-a-look-at-all-11-whove-doneit/#:~:text=Other%20NFL%20franchises%20to%20relocate,Chicago%20Cardinals%20mov
e%20to%20St.
169. Erik Spanberg, Expansion and relocation: From new franchises to moves in the
night, SPORTS BUS. J. (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/09/02/Teams-and-League/Expansion-and-Relocation.aspx.
170. Id. Note: the Patriots in 1971 moved from Boston to Foxboro, Mass. (and changed
their name to the New England Patriots) but remained in the Boston metropolitan area. Team
History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, https://www.profootballhof.com/teams/new-england-patriots/team-history/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
171. See, e.g., Emily Caron, When Did the Rams Move to Los Angeles?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/01/20/when-did-rams-move-losangeles-franchise-history-locations.
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the total number of NFL franchises has grown from twenty-eight before
the Single-Entity Ruling to thirty-two afterward.172
And the more things stay the same, the more they change: of the
eleven franchise relocations that have occurred in the past forty years,
five have involved either the return of the franchise to its former metropolitan home (the Raiders back to Oakland in 1995, the Rams back to
Los Angeles in 2016, and the Chargers back to Los Angeles in 2017) or
the replacement of a franchise that had moved out of its metropolitan
home (the Raiders replacing the Rams in Los Angeles in 1982 and the
Rams replacing the Cardinals in St. Louis in 1995).173 Not surprisingly,
each of these moves affected the largest market for NFL football, California, which until the Raiders moved to Nevada, was the only state to
host four teams.174
Similarly, thanks in part to the Single-Entity Ruling, franchise
movement restrictions have loosened in other major professional sports.
For example, the NBA was unable to stop the Clippers from moving
from San Diego to Los Angeles in 1984, even though they had failed to
ask for or receive the league’s permission.175
Second, the Single-Entity Ruling has exposed to antitrust scrutiny
a variety of anticompetitive practices other than franchise relocation policy. For example, in the NFL alone, the courts have rejected the league’s
repeated attempts to argue that its member clubs were incapable of conspiring among themselves in Sherman Act lawsuits challenging the following league policies or practices:
• A proposal to replace individual salary negotiations with a wage
scale setting the price for all player services.176 In rejecting the
NFL’s argument, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota cited the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Harry’s SingleEntity Ruling.177
• A resolution capping the salaries of development squad players
at $1,000 per week.178
172. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
NFL Teams by State 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/nfl-teams-by-state/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
173. Spanberg, supra note 169.
174. NFL Teams by State 2020, supra note 172.
175. See NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1987).
176. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 872, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1992).
177. See id. at 878-80 (citing L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381,
1389 (9th Cir. 1984)).
178. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., No. CIV. A. 90-1071(REL), 1992 WL 88039
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992), rev’d, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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• A rule prohibiting cross-ownership of soccer and other professional sports franchises by the owners of NFL franchises.179
• A rule favoring closely-held club ownership, and forbidding the
sale of club shares to the public.180 In rejecting the NFL’s argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cited the
Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling.181
Harry’s ultimate vindication came almost thirty years later, in
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 182 in which the Supreme Court rejected the NFL’s argument that it was immune from antitrust scrutiny insofar as the league, its franchises, and a separate entity
they had created that was engaged in the business of marketing the
clubs’ intellectual property with apparel manufacturers.183 Without citing the Single-Entity Ruling by name, the Court nevertheless embraced
Harry’s reasoning and result, and did so unanimously.184
Third, the Single-Entity ruling has helped spawn new forms of
sports ownership that were designed, among other things, to evade antitrust scrutiny by looking more like genuine parts of a single business
entity.
For example, the investor-operators of Major League Soccer (MLS)
are all financially invested in the same business entity: Major League
Soccer, LLC; no traditional franchise owners are permitted.185 As a result, they succeed or fail together. In exchange for an investment in the
LLC, each investor-operator is entitled to operate one of the teams, receive a pro-rata share of the overall profits or losses, and share certain
group revenues, such as television broadcast rights, league sponsorships,
and online sales.186 In effect, part of each club is owned by the league
and, therefore, each of the other clubs. But each investor-operator gets to
keep most local revenues, such as local broadcast rights, area
179. See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1249-50 (2d Cir. 1982).
180. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
181. See id. at 1099-1100 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL,
726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984)).
182. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
183. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 199-200.
184. See id. at 185, 199-200.
185. Peter Galindo, MLS’ Single-Entity Structure Is the League’s Biggest Obstacle,
BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 24, 2015), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2339627-mls-single-entity-structure-is-the-biggest-obstacle-for-the-league.
186. Emma Parker, A Match of Leagues—MLS v CSL, DUKE UNIV. (2020),
https://sites.duke.edu/soccerpoliticsemmaparker/homepage/corporate-structure-revenue-andexpenditure-flow/.

306

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

sponsorships, concessions and merchandise sold in the stadium, as well
as parking fees.187
If the NFL had been organized as the MLS actually is, then the
league might have prevailed in Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling.188 In the
case of professional team soccer, Harry’s influence has been to encourage
innovation in the structure of sports business ownership.
V. CONCLUSION
For a guy who thought sports were fun and liked to say, “Fun is
bullshit,” Harry Pregerson has had a significant impact on the application of antitrust law to major league team sports. His Single-Entity Ruling is likely to influence legal challenges to the franchise movement policy in the NFL and beyond for years to come.

187. See Isaac Krasny, Unpacking the Major League Soccer Business Model, MEDIUM
(June 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@isaac_krasny/unpacking-the-major-league-soccerbusiness-model-827f4b784bcd.
188. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2002)
(considering “hybrid” nature of MLS business structure but concluding that single-entity defense “need not be answered definitively” in case at bar).

